Introduction
Recently, an intriguing case has come to trial which poses both a moral and legal dilemma for those who would argue for the permissibility of abortions.' A California doctor was accused of strangling to death a surviving baby girl after a legal saline abortion. The infant, approximately twenty-nine to thirty-one weeks developed, had miraculously been delivered alive and was being given resuscitation and other aid by nurses when the doctor was informed of the situation. Without enquiring about the baby's condition, he ordered the nurses to render no assistance to her, but while he was returning to the hospital this order was disobeyed by the nurses. When the doctor appeared on the scene, the infant was still breathing. He was charged by another doctor, whom he summoned to the scene, with repeatedly strangling the baby until she finally ceased to breathe or exhibit a heartbeat.
The It is undoubtedly true that as medical science advances, the stage at which a fetus could be viable will tend to gradually recede towards the point of conception. This presents no new problems for this argument; we would simply have to reappraise the point at which only abortions that aim at the production of live infants would be required. Thus, what we have demonstrated is that given an assumption of self-ownership abortion is always a right of a woman unwillingly pregnant, but after the viability of the fetus such a procedure can only be applied if it aims at the delivery of a live infant. This approach provides certain advantages because it satisfies pro-abortionists by acknowledging the imprescriptible right of a woman to an abortion, while it grants the anti-abortionists at least part of their case in that fetuses that can survive independently cannot be deprived of that opportunity.
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"Thomson, J J, (1974 it is no part of the Pauls' case that the fetus is part of the body of the mother (or, as they significantly prefer, 'host'). Possibly, then, they wish rather to speak of a right to privacy (a concept mentioned in the judgment given in Roe v. Wade)? This would explain their speaking of the fetus as an 'intruder' and a 'virtual parasite'. But of course it would be less plausible for them to have framed their case in terms of privacy, since privacy is surely too weak a notion to justify overriding any rights the fetus may have and in particular it would not follow that the mother would have the right to abort whether or not the fetus has rights, as they conclude. Once it is conceded that the fetus has rights, and that those rights might conflict with the mother's, it cannot simply be asserted without proof that 'the intention of the host is justifiably to remove the fetus, not to kill it'.
That is just what must be proved. The Pauls will either have to invoke just the kind of version of the principle of double effect that is rightly discredited in moral theology, or they will have to appeal to the distinction between the rights of viable and those of non-viable fetuses which is one of the weakest parts of the legislation they are criticising.' I am also unconvinced by their other suggestion that we adopt the weaker ownership assumption to deal with the rights of aborted living infants. I am quite unconvinced that the mother has no responsibilities just because she has refused to accept any. Though I can quite appreciate the difficulty involved in deciding who should be responsible for an infant whose mother refuses to care for it, I do not see that this issue can be solved by a bland denial that any such responsibility exists. The Pauls are right to point out that to accept a stronger hypothesis about 'assistance rights' would not solve all the problems.
No, but it would locate them properly, and would 
